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Abstract
We study the size of fi scal multipliers in response to a government spending shock under 
different household leverage conditions in a general equilibrium setting with search and 
matching frictions. We allow for different levels of household indebtedness by changing the 
intensive margin of borrowing (loan-to-value ratio), as well as the extensive margin, defi ned 
as the number of borrowers over total population. The interaction between the consumption 
decisions of agents with limited access to credit and the process of wage bargaining and 
vacancy posting delivers two main results: (a) higher initial leverage makes it more likely to 
fi nd output multipliers higher than one; and (b) a positive government expenditure shock 
always produces a positive multiplier for vacancies and employment. The latter result is in 
sharp contrast to models in which some households do not have access to the fi nancial 
market (RoT consumers), in which the implied labor market responses to fi scal shocks 
are inconsistent with the empirical evidence. We also fi nd that the impact on GDP of 
consolidations is lower when consumers have a more limited capacity to borrow, and that 
increasing government spending in an episode of intense private deleveraging can still 
generate positive and signifi cant effects on consumption and output, although the fi scal 
output (employment) multiplier decreases (increases) with the intensity of the credit crunch. 
In the model with indebted impatient households we also observe that output (employment) 
multipliers decrease (increase) markedly with the degree of shock persistence and increase 
with the degree of price stickiness.
Keywords: Fiscal multipliers, private leverage, labour market search.
JEL classifi cation: E24, E44, E62.
Resumen
En este trabajo estudiamos el tamaño de los multiplicadores fi scales en respuesta a un shock 
de gasto público. Consideramos diferentes escenarios de endeudamiento de las familias 
en un marco de equilibrio general con fricciones en la búsqueda y el emparejamiento. 
Tenemos en cuanta diferentes grados de endeudamiento de las familias, cambiando 
tanto el margen intensivo (loan-to-value ratio), como el extensivo, defi nido como el porcentaje 
de prestatarios sobre la población total. La interacción de las decisiones de consumo de 
agentes con limitado acceso al crédito, con el proceso de negociación salarial y de apertura 
de vacantes genera dos resultados fundamentales: (a) un apalancamiento inicial mayor 
hace más probable obtener multiplicadores mayores que la unidad; y (b) un shock de gasto 
público positivo genera siempre un multiplicador positivo para vacantes y empleo. Este 
último resultado contrasta con el que se obtiene en modelos en los que algunos agentes 
no tienen acceso al mercado fi nanciero (consumidores RoT) y que generan respuestas 
de las variables del mercado de trabajo incompatibles con la evidencia empírica. También 
encontramos que el impacto sobre el PIB de las consolidaciones fiscales es menor 
cuanto menor es la capacidad de endeudamiento de los consumidores, y que incrementar el 
gasto público durante un periodo de fuerte desapalancamiento privado puede generar 
efectos positivos y signifi cativos sobre el output y el consumo, si bien el multiplicador 
fi scal del output (empleo) se reduce (incrementa) con la intensidad del shock crediticio. 
En el modelo con consumidores impacientes y endeudados también obtenemos que el 
multiplicador del output (empleo) disminuye (aumenta) signifi cativamente con el grado de 
persistencia. Ambos multiplicadores aumentan con el grado de rigidez de precios.
Palabras claves: Multiplicador fi scal, endeudamiento privado, búsqueda.
Códigos JEL: E24, E44, E62.
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1. Introduction
The current economic crisis has aroused a renewed interest in fiscal policy as a stabilization
tool. For many years the predominant view of pundits in the field, as represented by
the so-called Jackson Hole consensus (see Bean et al, 2010), held that discretionary fiscal
stimuli had an effect on output and employment ranging from weakly positive to negative.
The only relevant use for this instrument should then be confined to the role of automatic
stabilizers. This view changed rapidly during the early days of the financial turmoil when
most academics and policy makers called for strong spending hikes and/or tax cuts to
keep the world economy from plunging into an even deeper recession. Two years later
many countries started to undo such fiscal actions, fearing the reaction of financial markets
to the rapid surge of public debt all over the developed world. The discussion on the
output and employment effects of government spending stimuli -and the likely reaction of
the different economies to their withdrawal- has been central to the political and academic
debate over the last two years.1 This discussion has been going on for a long time now
on a broader scale, accumulating a substantial amount of international empirical evidence
in favor of each of the different views. This is reflected, for instance, in the IMF World
Economic Outlook (2010) and the results in Alesina and Ardagna (2010). While the IMF
report finds that discretionary cuts in public spending or tax hikes are contractionary with
a moderate but significant effect on output and employment, Alesina and Ardagna (2010)
argue that fiscal contractions might even be expansionary under fairly general conditions,
and specially so in periods of fiscal stress and high public debt levels.
The positive effects of fiscal impulses that many authors find in empirical research
are difficult to accommodate in general equilibrium macroeconomic models, especially
with standard preferences and forward looking Ricardian consumers. Galí, López-Salido
and Vallés (2007) obtained fiscal multipliers consistent with the empirical evidence assum-
ing that a significant proportion of the population does not have access to this intertem-
poral substitution. These households do not participate in the financial market and their
consumption is simply equal to their disposable income. But the fact is that most agents
actually participate in the financial market either as lenders or borrowers. Debt is the
key feature of the current financial crisis that has taken most firms and households highly
leveraged with mortgages and other loans, after many years of financial deepening linked
to the growing demand for housing. This is likely to affect their labor market choices, as
well as their consumption behavior, since these agents’ consumption is not only related
to their labor income, but also to their net worth and hence to the evolution of inflation,
interest rates, total debt and asset prices.
1 See Romer and Bernstein (2009), Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2010) and Uhlig (2010), among others,
regarding the expected impact of the US fiscal packages.
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Some recent papers have pointed out the linkage between the presence of strongly
debt-constrained agents and the delivery of economic activity in the present slump. For
instance, Eggertsson and Krugman (2010) argue that under a credit crunch the economy is
likely to fall into the liquidity trap and that more public debt can be an appropriate solution
to a private debt-induced slump. In a fully specified dynamic model, Hall (2011) studies
the response of output and unemployment when the economy is hit by three adverse
forces related to the stock of housing, the number of liquidity constrained households
and the degree of financial frictions. Furthermore, Mian and Sufi (2010) exploit county-
level data for the US and find clear correlation between the growth of household leverage
from 2002 to 2006 and the fall in house prices and the rise in unemployment after the
crisis. Glick and Lansing (2010) also find that the countries that experienced the largest
declines in household consumption, once house prices started falling after the financial
crisis, were those that prior to 2007 suffered the highest increases in house prices and
household leverage.
In this paper we analyze the incidence of household leverage in the response of
consumption, (un)employment and output to discretionary fiscal measures within a DSGE
framework, an issue that has received scant attention to date2. We study the size of
fiscal multipliers paying special attention to the main determinants of consumption, labor
income and net worth, and to that end we augment the canonical neo-Keynesian model
in two directions. Since the dynamics of labor market variables is essential in the trans-
mission of fiscal impulses, we allow for two-sided market power, wage bargaining and
matching frictions in the vein of Andolfatto’s (1996) model. We also include financial
frictions drawing on Iacoviello (2005). All agents in the economy participate in the finan-
cial market, but due to differences in their subjective valuation of the future, the most
impatient of them borrow from the patient ones. Since differences in discount factors are
deterministic, the amount of borrowing is limited by the value of the collateral given by the
expected value of the household’s housing holding. Hence, even constrained consumers
leave some room for intertemporal substitution, such that a modified version of the Euler
condition on consumption still prevails.3.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, under a fairly
standard characterization, the model delivers impulse response fiscal multipliers in line
2 A non-exhaustive list of exceptions includes Callegari (2007), Roeger and int Veld (2009), Eggertsonn and
Krugman (2010) and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011). Other approaches connect fiscal policy and financial fric-
tions through the effect on the financial premium paid by firms (see Fernández-Villaverde, 2010 and Carrillo and
Poilly, 2011).
3 In previous papers (Andrés and Arce, 2010, Andrés, Boscá and Ferri, 2011 and Boscá, Doménech and Ferri,
2011), we have looked at some of the mechanisms involved in our model. Here we extend this line of research
by analyzing the interaction between the consumption decisions of agents with limited access to credit and the
process of wage bargaining and vacancy posting.
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with the empirical literature. In particular, while we obtain positive multipliers, the con-
sumption response is positive but lower than that predicted by the standard model with
rule-of-thumb (RoT) consumers. Second, our model predicts that vacancies and employ-
ment will grow after a fiscal expansion, as observed in the data, while the RoT model
predicts the opposite. In the RoT model, the increase in wages is so strong that firms are
less inclined to post more vacancies and exploit the intensive margin by increasing hours
and reducing employment. Third, the greater the borrowing capacity (as measured by a
higher loan-to-value ratio), the stronger the impact multiplier of fiscal policy. Impatient
households borrow to the limit of their constraint, thus increasing their consumption
substantially when the loan-to-value ratio is high, contributing to a higher aggregate mul-
tiplier. Notice that this result can be read in two ways regarding the current policy debate.
With high leverage, multipliers are expected to be large because constrained consumers
find it easy to borrow, but fiscal expansions lose strength after a credit crunch. Thus, pre-
crisis multipliers might not be a good indicator of the likely impact of fiscal policy after
the deterioration in the conditions under which households have access to credit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the empirical
literature; section 3 summarizes the model; section 4 deals with calibration, while section
5 presents the main simulation results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Review of the empirical literature
In this section we present a non-exhaustive review of the main results in the literature
regarding the impact of fiscal policies on the following variables: output, consumption,
(un)employment and vacancies. Investment and real wages play an important role in the
transmission of fiscal shocks, but their response is less controversial and can be easily
reproduced in a broad class of macroeconomic models.
The empirical analysis of the fiscal multiplier gathered momentum after the work
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who estimated a VAR for the US economy with a careful
identification approach to the effect of discretionary fiscal policy changes. They found that,
consistent with a Keynesian view, output and consumption increase while investment falls
in response to a positive government spending shock. These results are consistent with
those obtained by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Galí,
López-Salido and Vallés (2007) and Perotti (1999), among others. Using a similar method-
ology Perotti (2004) found coincident results for these variables for Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom and Germany. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) use a sign restriction
methodology to identify the effects of fiscal shocks and find that private consumption
does not change significantly in response to an unexpected increase in government spend-
ing. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) and McGrattan
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and Ohanian (2003) have focussed on particular and well identified episodes of military
spending increases in the United States and conclude that such fiscal expansions have a
significant and positive short-run effect on output, that fades away after some years.
In contrast with these results, another stream of the literature has found that contrac-
tionary policies have expansionary effects on output, i.e. that fiscal policy may have non-
Keynesian effects. Beginning with the work of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), many studies
have analyzed the macroeconomic effect of fiscal consolidations. In their survey for this
literature, Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz (2002) conclude that there are many examples in
which fiscal contractions have had expansionary effects on output, private consumption
and investment. As Perotti (1999) found, the initial conditions of some key variables can
explain why fiscal expansions have a positive effect in ’good times’ but a negative one in
’bad times’, when fiscal consolidations are needed.
The financial crisis has aroused renewed interest in the effects of fiscal policy as the
debate involving Romer and Bernstein (2009), Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2010),
Uhlig (2010) and Taylor (2011) demonstrates. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) find that there
is almost the same probability of the effect of fiscal stimuli resulting in an output expansion
as in a contraction and that the outcome depends crucially on the particular components
of government spending and taxes that change. Barro and Redlick (2009) measure the
impact of fiscal policy by looking at very long series for the US and a careful identification
procedure focusing on the role of military spending. They find small consumption multi-
pliers leading to output multipliers of approximately 0.4-0.7. Interestingly, they find that
changes in tax revenue have a smaller impact on output than variations in the marginal
tax rate; they conclude that labor supply dominates aggregate demand as a mechanism
for the transmission of fiscal shocks. Romer and Romer (2009, 2010), following a narrative
approach, find strong output responses to tax changes in the US. The same approach has
inspired the recent work by Leigh et al. (2010), who have looked at many episodes in a
broad sample of developed countries and find that, albeit small, output multipliers are
unambiguously positive and that fiscal contraction has a negative impact on output.
Some authors have looked to other determinants of the effectiveness of fiscal poli-
cies. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) estimate state-dependent fiscal multipliers,
documenting a higher effectiveness of government spending shocks in recessions than in
expansions. Still, important differences between historical episodes are lumped together
by these authors. There is widespread consensus about the importance of the monetary
policy reaction to fiscal shocks as a major determinant of the size of the multipliers (Wood-
ford, 2010), which become unusually large if the economy hits the zero bound of the
nominal interest rate (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2009).
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tive, albeit not too large effect on output. This idea is also supported by the recent survey
of Ramey (2011) who offers a range between 0.8 and 1.5 for the output multiplier corres-
ponding to a temporary rise in government purchases. Beyond that, the precise value of
the fiscal multiplier is difficult to gauge. Tagkalakis (2008) finds empirical support, using
a panel of nineteen OECD countries, for the idea that fiscal policy can have asymmetric
effects on consumption in recessions and expansions in the presence of binding liquidity
constraints. The papers by Caldara and Kamps (2008), Coenen et al. (2010) and Cogan et al.
(2010) are cited by Leeper (2010) as a proof of the difficulty of producing a simple answer
to the question of whether, or to what extent, fiscal policy is effective as a stabilization
tool, a situation he calls the "fiscal morass". Also, in their empirical survey, Spilimbergo
et al. (2009) find that "the size of the fiscal multiplier is country-, time-, and circumstance-
specific". A similar result is reached in the papers by both Ilzetski et al. (2011) and
Favero et al. (2011). They conclude that the impact of government expenditure shocks
or fiscal consolidation depends crucially on key country characteristics, such as the level
of development, exchange rate regime, openness to trade, public debt dynamics and fiscal
reaction functions.
Less attention has been paid to the effect of financial conditions on the fiscal mul-
tiplier. As regards the role of financial conditions, Afonso, Baxa and Slavik (2011) report
evidence of nonlinearities in the effects of fiscal shocks on economic activity depending on
a set of initial conditions determined by the existence of financial stress, diverse levels of
government indebtedness and different implicitly assumed monetary policy behavior.
The ultimate effects of fiscal expansions on the economy crucially depend on the
reaction of employment. Despite that, the response of labor market variables to fiscal
shocks has received less attention in the literature. However, the scant empirical literature
on this issue points towards a government spending shock having a positive effect on
vacancies and employment and a negative effect on unemployment (see Monacelli, Perotti
and Trigari, 2010, and Ravn and Simonelli, 2008). Using a different sample span, Brückner
and Pappa (2010) find a positive effect on employment, although the unemployment rate
may not fall due to an increase in the participation rate.
The model we describe in the next section explores the connection of consumption
and output fiscal multipliers with the financial conditions of the economy as represented
by the degree of household indebtedness. The economic mechanism explaining the mag-
nitude of the fiscal multiplier depends crucially on the labor market reactions of economic
agents to the fiscal shock.
Our interpretation of the literature is that fiscal expansions generally have a posi-
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nal good and two factors of production: productive capital and labor. While capital is
exchanged in a perfectly competitive market, the labor market is non-Walrasian. Besides
labor and capital, households own all the firms operating in the economy. Households rent
capital and labor services to firms and receive income in the form of interest and wages.
Firms post new vacancies every period, paying a fixed cost while the vacancy remains
unfilled. The fact that trade in the labor market is costly, in terms of resources and time,
generates a monopoly rent associated with each job match. It is assumed that workers
and firms bargain over these monopoly rents in Nash fashion. Each household is made
up of working-age agents who may be either employed or unemployed. If unemployed,
agents are actively searching for a job. Firm investment in vacant posts is endogenously
determined and so are job inflows. Job destruction is considered exogenous.
The model goes one step beyond Mankiw’s model of savers and spenders (Mankiw,
2000). As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005), there are two types of
representative households, Nlt of them are patient and N
b
t are impatient. All have access to
the financial market and patient households are characterized by having a lower discount
rate than impatient ones. This ensures that in the steady-state, and under fairly general
conditions, patient households are net lenders and the owners of physical capital, while
impatient households are net borrowers. Due to some underlying friction in the financial
market, borrowers face a binding constraint in the amount of credit they can take, which
is given by the expected real value of their real estate holdings. Houses are assumed to
be the only collateralizable asset. The size of the working-age population is given by
Nt = Nlt + N
b
t . Let 1 − τb and τb denote the proportions of lenders and borrowers in
the working-age population; these shares are assumed to be constant over time, unless
otherwise stated. For simplicity, we assume no growth in the working-age population.
3.1 Patient households
The representative household faces the following maximization program,
max
clt ,k
l
t ,j
l
t ,b
l
t ,x
l
t
Et
∞
∑
t=0
(βl)t
⎡
⎣ ln

clt

+ φx ln

xlt

+ nlt−1φ1
(1−l1t)1−η
1−η
+(1− nlt−1)φ2
(1−l2)1−η
1−η
⎤
⎦ (1)
subject to
clt + j
l
t

1+
φ
2

jlt
klt−1

+ qt

xlt − xlt−1

− blt − b
p
t =
wtl1nlt−1 + rtk
l
t−1 + d
l
t − (1+ rnt−1)

blt−1
1+ πt
+
bpt−1
1+ πt

+ trhlt − ζ lt (2)
3. The model
We model a decentralized closed economy in which households and firms trade one fi-
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klt = j
l
t + (1− δ)klt−1 (3)
nlt = (1− σ)nlt−1 + ρwt (1− nlt−1) (4)
Lower case variables in the maximization problem above are normalized by the within
group working-age population (Nlt ). In our notation, variables and parameters indexed
by b and l denote, respectively, impatient and patient households. Non-indexed variables
apply indistinctly to both types of households. Thus clt, x
l
t,n
l
t−1 and (1 − nlt−1) represent
consumption, housing holdings, the employment rate and the unemployment rate of pa-
tient households. The time endowment is normalized to one. l1t and l2 are hours worked
per employee and hours devoted to job seeking by the unemployed. As we will explain
later while the household bargains over l1t, the amount of time devoted to job seeking
(l2) is assumed to be exogenous, such that individual households take it as given. Future
utility is discounted at a rate of βl ∈ (0, 1), the parameter − 1η measures the negative of
the Frisch elasticity of the labor supply and φx is the weight of housing in life-time utility.
The subjective value of leisure imputed by workers may vary across employment statuses
(φ1 = φ2).
Maximization of (1) is constrained as follows. First, the budget constraint (2) descri-
bes the various sources and uses of income. The term wtnlt−1l1t captures net labor income
earned by the fraction of employed workers, where wt stands for hourly real wages. There
are three assets in the economy. First, private physical capital (klt), which is owned solely
by patient households who get rt−1klt−1 in return, where rt represents the gross return
on physical capital. Given that firms make extraordinary profits, we assume that lenders
receive these in the form of dividends dlt. Second, there are loans/debt in the economy.
Thus, patient households lend in real terms −blt (or borrow blt) to the private sector and
−bpt to the public sector. They receive back −(1+ rnt−1)blt−1 from the private sector, where
rnt−1 is the nominal interest rate on loans between t − 1 and t. Notice that in the budget
constraint (2), the gross inflation rate between t − 1 and t (πt) in the term (1+ rnt−1)
blt−1
πt
reflects the assumption that debt contracts are set in nominal terms. Third, there is a
fixed amount of real estate in the economy4 and the term qt

xlt − xlt−1

denotes housing
investment by patient households, where qt is the real housing price.
Consumption and investment are respectively given by clt and j
l
t

1+ φ2

jlt
kt−1

.
4 As in Iacoviello (2005), the assumption of an aggregate fixed housing stock is not crucial to the propagation
mechanism of shocks in the economy.
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Total investment outlays are affected by increasing marginal costs of installation. There
are also adjustment costs stemming from changing the housing stock that we model as:
ζ lt = φh

xlt − xlt−1

/xlt−1
2
qtxlt−1/2
Households receive (pay) lump sum transfers (taxes) from (to) the government

trhlt

.
The remaining constraints faced by Ricardian households concern the laws of mo-
tion for capital and employment. Each period private capital stock klt−1 depreciates at the
exogenous rate δ and is accumulated through investment jlt. Thus, it evolves according
to (3). Employment obeys the law of motion (4), where nlt−1 and (1 − nlt−1) respectively
denote the fraction of employed and unemployed optimizing workers in the economy at
the beginning of period t. Each period, jobs are destroyed at the exogenous rate σ. Like-
wise, new employment opportunities come at the rate ρwt , which represents the probability
that one unemployed worker will find a job. Although the job-finding rate ρwt is taken
as exogenous by individual workers, at aggregate level it is endogenously determined
according to the following Cobb-Douglas matching function5,
ρwt (1− nt−1) = χ1v
χ2
t [(1− nt−1) l2]
1−χ2 (5)
where vt stands for the number of active vacancies during period t.
Given the recursive structure of the above problem, it may be equivalently rewritten
in terms of a dynamic program. Thus, the value function W(Ωlt) satisfies the following
Bellman equation,
W(Ωlt) = max
clt ,k
l
t ,j
l
t ,b
l
t ,x
l
t
⎧
⎨
⎩
ln

clt

+ φx ln

xlt

+ nlt−1φ1
(1−l1t)1−η
1−η
+(1− nlt−1)φ2
(1−l2)1−η
1−η + β
lEtW(Ωlt+1)
⎫
⎬
⎭ (6)
where maximization is subject to constraints (2), (3) and (4). The solution to the optimiza-
tion program above generates the following first-order conditions for consumption, capital
stock, investment, loans and the holdings of housing:
λl1t =
1
clt
(7)
λl2t
λl1t
= βlEt
λl1t+1
λl1t

rt+1 +
φ
2
jl2t+1
kl2t
+
λl2t+1
λl1t+1
(1− δ)

(8)
5 This specification presumes that all workers are identical to the firm.
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λl2t = λ
l
1t

1+ φ

jlt
klt−1

(9)
1 = βlEt
λl1t+1
λl1t


rnt + 1
1+ πt+1

(10)
λl1tqt

1+ φh

xlt
xlt−1
− 1

=
φx
xlt
+βlEtqt+1λl1t+1

1+
1
2
φh

xlt+1
xlt
− 1

xlt+1
xlt
+ 1

(11)
According to condition (7) the current marginal utility of consumption is the inverse of
actual consumption. Expression (8) ensures that the intertemporal reallocation of capital
cannot improve the household’s utility. Equation (9) states that investment is undertaken
to the extent that the opportunity cost of a marginal increase in investment in terms of
consumption is equal to its marginal expected contribution to the household’s utility. Euler
condition (10) means that variations across periods in the marginal utility of consumption
are coherent with the discount rate and existing real interest rates. Finally, expression (11)
represents the dynamics of the demand for housing.
For later use we define the marginal value of employment for a worker λlht, as:
λlht ≡
∂Wlt
∂nlt−1
= λl1twtl1t +

φ1
(1− l1t)1−η
1− η − φ2
(1− l2)1−η
1− η

+ (1− σ − ρwt )βlEt
∂Wlt+1
∂nt
(12)
where λlht measures the marginal contribution of a newly created job to the utility of the
household. The first term captures the value of the cash-flow generated by the new job
in t, i.e. the labor income measured according to its utility value in terms of consumption
(λl1t). The second term on the right-hand side of (12) represents the net utility arising from
the newly created job. Finally, the third term represents the "capital value" of an additional
employed worker, given that the employment status will persist in the future, conditional
to the probability that the new job will not be lost.
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rate satisfies βb < βl and face the following maximization program,
max
cbt ,b
b
t ,x
b
t
Et
∞
∑
t=0
(βb)t
⎡
⎣ ln

cbt

+ φx ln

xbt

+ nbt−1φ1
(1−l1t)1−η
1−η
+(1− nbt−1)φ2
(1−l2)1−η
1−η
⎤
⎦ (13)
subject to the specific liquidity constraint, a borrowing limit and the law of motion of
employment, as reflected in
cbt + qt

xbt − xbt−1

− bbt = wtl1tnbt−1 −
(1+ rnt−1)b
b
t−1
1+ πt
+ trhbt − ζbt (14)
bbt ≤ mbEt

qt+1 (1+ πt+1) xbt
1+ rnt

(15)
nbt = (1− σ)nbt−1 + ρwt (1− nbt−1) (16)
where ζbt = φh

xbt − xbt−1

/xbt−1
2
qtxbt−1/2 denotes the housing adjustment cost. Both
the parameter φx, which accounts for housing weight in life-time utility, and the housing
adjustment function are the same as those for patient households.
Notice that restrictions (14) and (16) are analogous to those for patient individuals
(with the exception that impatient households do not accumulate physical capital). In
the mortgage market, the maximum loan that an individual can get is a fraction of the
liquidation value of the amount of housing held by the representative household; thus
mb ∈ [0, 1] in (15) represents the loan-to-value ratio. As shown in Iacoviello (2005), without
uncertainty the assumption βb < βl guarantees that the borrowing constraint holds with
equality.
In the case of impatient households, the value function W(Ωbt ) satisfies the follo-
wing Bellman equation,
W(Ωbt ) = max
cbt ,b
b
t ,x
b
t
⎧
⎨
⎩
ln

cbt

+ φx ln

xbt

+ nbt−1φ1
(1−l1t)1−η
1−η
+(1− nbt−1)φ2
(1−l2)1−η
1−η + β
bEtW(Ωbt+1)
⎫
⎬
⎭ (17)
where maximization is subject to constraints (14), (15) and (16). The solution to the opti-
mization program is characterized by the following first-order conditions:
λb1t =
1
cbt
(18)
3.2 Impatient households
Impatient households discount the future more heavily than patient ones, so their discount
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λb1t = β
bEtλb1t+1

1+ rnt
1+ πt+1

+ μbt (1+ r
n
t ) (19)
λb1tqt

1+ φh

xbt
xbt−1
− 1

=
φx
xbt
+ μbt m
bqt+1(1+ πt+1)
βbqt+1λb1t+1

1+
1
2
φh

xbt+1
xbt
− 1

xbt+1
xbt
+ 1

(20)
where μbt is the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint and the marginal value of
employment for an impatient household worker (λbht) can be obtained as,
λbht ≡
∂Wbt
∂nbt−1
= λb1twtl1t +

φ1
(1− l1t)1−η
1− η − φ2
(1− l2)1−η
1− η

+ (1− σ − ρwt )βbEt
∂Wbt+1
∂nt
(21)
which can be interpreted in the same way as that of patient households.
3.3 Aggregation
Aggregate consumption and employment are a weighted average of the corresponding
variables for each household type,
ct =

1− τb

clt + τ
bcbt (22)
nt =

1− τb

nlt + τ
bnbt (23)
τbbbt + (1− τb)blt = 0 (24)
τbxbt + (1− τb)xlt = X (25)
where X is the fixed stock of real estate in the economy. For the variables that exclusively
concern patient households, aggregation is merely performed as:
kt =

1− τb

klt (26)
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jt =

1− τb

jlt (27)
In addition, we consider an aggregator (trade union) that combines the surpluses
from employment of both types of households, in terms of consumption, and use this
aggregate in the negotiation of hours and wages:
λht =

1− τb
 λlht
λl1t
+ τb
λbht
λb1t
(28)
Lump sum transfers are aggregated in the usual way as
trht = τbtrhbt +

1− τb

trhlt
where we also assume that transfers are distributed according to the population size in
each group such that trhbt = trh
l
t = trht. Finally, the aggregate public debt is given by,
bt = −

1− τb

bpt
3.4 Production
The productive sector is organized in three different levels: (1) firms in the wholesale sector
use labor and capital to produce a homogenous good that is sold in a competitive flexible
price market at a price Pwt ; (2) the homogenous good is bought by firms (indexed by #j)
in the intermediate sector and converted, without the use of any other input, into a firm-
specific variety that is sold in a monopolistically competitive market, in which prices are
sticky; (3) finally there is a competitive retail aggregator that buys differentiated varieties
(y#jt) and sells a homogeneous final good (yt) at price Pt.
The competitive retail sector
The competitive retail aggregator buys differentiated goods from firms in the intermediate
sector and sells a homogeneous final good yt at price Pt. Each variety y#jt is purchased at a
price P#jt. Profit maximization by the retailer implies
Maxy#jt
&
Ptyt −
 
P#jty#jtd#j
'
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subject to,
yt =
 
y(1−1/θ)#jt d#j
	 θ
θ−1
(29)
where θ > 1 is a parameter that can be expressed in terms of the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods κ ≥ 0, as θ = (1+κ) /κ. The first-order condition gives us
the following expression for the demand of each variety:
y#jt =

P#jt
Pt
−θ
yt (30)
Also from the zero profit condition of the aggregator, the retailer’s price is given by:
Pt =
! 1
0

P#jt
1−θ
d#j
	 1
1−θ
(31)
The monopolistically competitive intermediate sector
The monopolistically competitive intermediate sector comprises #j = 1, ...#J firms each of
which buys the production of competitive wholesale firms at a common price Pwt and sells
a differentiated variety y#jt at price P#jt to the final competitive retailing sector described
above. Variety producers stagger prices. Following Calvo (1983), only some firms set their
prices optimally each period. Those firms that do not reset their prices optimally at t adjust
them according to a simple indexation rule to catch up with lagged inflation. Thus, each
period a proportion ω of firms simply set P#jt = (1+ πt−1)
ς P#jt−1 (with ς representing the
degree of indexation and πt−1 the inflation rate in t− 1). The fraction of firms (of measure
1−ω) that set the optimal price at t seek to maximize the present value of expected profits.
Consequently, 1−ω represents the probability of adjusting prices each period, whereas ω
can be interpreted as a measure of price rigidity. Thus, the maximization problem of the
representative variety producer can be written as,
max
P∗#jt
Et
∞
∑
s=0
Λt,t+s (βω)
s
$
P∗#jtπt+sy#jt+s − Pt+smc#jt,t+s

y#jt+s + κ f
%
(32)
subject to
y#jt+s =

P∗#jt
s
∏
s	=1
(1+ πt+s	−1)
ς
−θ
Pθt+syt+s (33)
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where P∗#jt is the price set by the optimizing firm at time t, πt+s =
s
∏
s	=1
(1+ πt+s	−1)
ς,
mc#jt,t+s =
Pwt+s
Pt+s = μ
−1
t+s represents the real marginal cost (inverse mark-up) borne at t + j
by the firm that last set its price in period t, Pwt+s the price of the good produced by the
wholesale competitive sector, κ f is an entry cost which ensures that extraordinary profits
vanish in imperfectly-competitive equilibrium, and Λt,t+s is a price kernel which captures
the marginal utility of an additional unit of profits accruing to households at t+ s, i.e.,
EtΛt,t+s
EtΛt,t+s−1
=
Et(λ1t+s/Pt+s)
Et(λ1t+s−1/Pt+s−1)
(34)
The solution for this problem is
P∗#jt =

θ
θ − 1
 Et ∑∞s=0 (βω)s Λt,t+s

μ−1t+s (Pt+s)
θ+1 yt+s

s
∏
s	=1
(1+ πt+s	−1)
ς
−θ
Et ∑∞s=0 (βω)
s Λt,t+s

(Pt+s)
θ yt+s

s
∏
s	=1
(1+ πt+s	−1)
ς
1−θ (35)
Taking into account (31) and that θ is assumed time invariant, the corresponding
aggregate price level is given by,
Pt =
$
ω

Pt−1π
ς
t−1
1−θ
+ (1− ω) (P∗t )1−θ
% 1
1−θ (36)
From (31) and (36) we can obtain an expression for aggregate inflation of the form,
πt = γ
f Etπt+1 + "mct + γbπt−1
where γ f = β1+ςβ , γ
b = ς1+ςβ and  =
(1−βω)(1−ω)
ω(1+ςβ) .
The competitive wholesale sector
The competitive wholesale sector consists of j = 1, ...J firms each selling a different quan-
tity of a homogeneous good at the same price Pwt to the monopolistically competitive
intermediate sector. Firms in the perfectly competitive wholesale sector carry out the
actual production using labor and capital. Factor demands are obtained by solving the
cost minimization problem faced by each competitive producer (we drop the firm index j
for simplicity),
min
kt ,vt
Et
∞
∑
t=0
(βl)t
λl1t+1
λl1t
(rt−1kt−1 + wtnt−1l1t + κvvt) (37)
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subject to
ynt = Ak
1−α
t−1 (nt−1l1t)
α − κ f (38)
nt = (1− σ)nt−1 + ρ
f
t vt (39)
where, in accordance with the ownership structure of the economy, future profits are
discounted at the relevant rate

(βl)t
λl1t+1
λl1t

of the patient household. Producers use two
inputs, private capital and labor, combined in a standard Cobb-Douglas constant-returns-
to-scale production function. ρ ft is the probability that a vacancy will be filled in any given
period t. It is worth noting that the probability of filling a vacant post ρ ft is exogenous
from the perspective of the firm. However, as far as the overall economy is concerned,
this probability is endogenously determined according to the following Cobb-Douglas
matching function:
ρwt (1− nt−1) = ρ
f
t vt = χ1v
χ2
t [(1− nt−1) l2]
1−χ2 (40)
We can express the maximum expected value of the firm in state Ω ft as a function
V(Ω ft ) that satisfies the following Bellman equation:
V(Ω ft ) = maxkt ,vt

yt − rt−1kt−1 − wtnt−1l1t − κvvt + βlEt
λl1t+1
λl1t
V(Ω ft+1)

(41)
The solution to the optimization program above generates the following first-order condi-
tions for private capital and the number of vacancies
rt = (1− α)mct+1
yt+1
kt
(42)
κv
ρ
f
t
= βlEt
λl1t+1
λl1t
∂Vt+1
∂nt
(43)
where the demand for private capital is determined by (42). It is positively related to
the marginal productivity of capital (1 − α) yt+1kt which, in equilibrium, must equate the
gross return on physical capital. Expression (43) reflects that firms choose the number of
vacancies in such a way that the marginal recruiting cost per vacancy, κv, is equal to the
expected present value of holding it βlEt
λl1t+1
λl1t
ρ
f
t
∂Vt+1
∂nt+1
.
Using the Bellman equation, the marginal value of an additional job in t for a firm
(λ f t) is,
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λ f t ≡
∂Vt
∂nt−1
= αmct
yt
nt−1
− wtl1t + (1− σ)βlEt
λl1t+1
λl1t
∂Vt+1
∂nt
(44)
where the marginal contribution of a new job to profits equals the marginal product net
of the wage rate, plus the capital value of the new job in t, corrected for the probability
that the job will continue in the future. Now using (44) one period ahead, we can rewrite
condition (43) as:
κv
ρ
f
t
= βlEt

λl1t+1
λl1t

αmct+1
yt+1
nt
− wt+1l1t+1 + (1− σ)
κv
ρ
f
t+1

(45)
3.5 Trade in the labor market: the labor contract
The key departure of search models from the competitive paradigm is that trading in the
labor market is subject to transaction costs. Each period, the unemployed engage in job
seeking activities in order to find vacant posts spread over the economy. A costly search
in the labor market implies that there are simultaneous flows into and out of the state of
employment, so an increase (reduction) in the stock of unemployment results from the
predominance of job losses (creation) over job creation (losses). Stable unemployment
occurs whenever inflows and outflows cancel each other out, i.e.,
ρ
f
t vt = ρ
w
t (1− nt−1) = χ1v
χ2
t [(1− nt−1) l2]
1−χ2 = σnt−1 (46)
As it takes time (for households) and real resources (for firms) to make profitable
contacts, some pure economic rent emerges with each new job, which is equal to the sum
of the expected transaction (search) costs the firm and the worker will further incur if they
refuse to match. The emergence of such rent gives rise to a bilateral monopoly framework.
Once a representative job-seeking worker and vacancy-offering firm match, they negotiate
a labor contract in hours and wages. There is risk-sharing at the household level and
hence consumption within each household type is independent of the employment status.
Although patient and impatient households may have different reservation wages, they
delegate the bargain process with firms to trade unions. This trade union maximizes the
aggregate marginal value of employment for workers (28) and distributes employment ac-
cording to their shares in the working-age population. The implication of this assumption
is that all workers receive the same wage, work the same number of hours and suffer the
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maximizes the weighted product of the parties’ surpluses from employment.
max
wt,l1t

1− τb
 λlht
λl1t
+ τb
λbht
λb1t
λw 
λ f t
1−λw
= max
wt,l1t
(λht)
λw

λ f t
1−λw
(47)
where λw ∈ [0, 1] reflects workers’ bargaining power. The first term in brackets represents
the worker’s surplus (as a weighted average of borrowers’ and lenders’ surpluses), while
the second is the firm’s surplus. More specifically, λlht/λ
l
1t and λ
b
ht/λ
b
1t respectively denote
the earning premium (in terms of consumption) of employment over unemployment for a
patient and an impatient worker.
The solution of the Nash maximization problem gives the optimal real wage and
hours worked (Boscá, Doménech and Ferri, 2011):
wtl1t = λw

αmct
yt
nt−1
+
κvvt
(1− nt−1)

(48)
+(1− λw)

(1− τb)
λl1t
+
τb
λb1t

φ2
(1− l2)1−η
1− η − φ1
(1− l1t)1−η
1− η

+(1− λw)(1− σ − ρwt )τbEt
λbht+1
λb1t+1

βl
λl1t+1
λl1t
− βb λ
b
1t+1
λb1t

αmct
yt
nt−1l1,t
=

1− τb
λl1t
+
τb
λb1t

φ1(1− l1t)−η (49)
Unlike the Walrasian outcome, the wage prevailing in the search equilibrium is related
(although not equal) to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure and
the marginal productivity of labor, depending on worker bargaining power λw. Putting
aside the last term on the right hand side, the wage is a weighted average of the highest
feasible wage (i.e., the marginal productivity of labor plus hiring costs per unemployed
worker) and the outside option (i.e., the reservation wage as given by the difference be-
tween the utility of leisure of an unemployed person and an employed worker). This
reservation wage is, in turn, a weighted average of the lowest acceptable wage of both
types of workers. They differ in the marginal utility of consumption (λl1t and λ
b
1t). If the
marginal utility of consumption is high, the workers are ready to accept a relatively low
wage.
tract to avoid multi-person Nash bargaining with asymmetric information on outside options. In any case, our
approach makes it possible to circumvent problems associated with incentives for workers to reveal preferences
and firms to perform screening. In addition, as Stähler and Thomas (2011) show in a model with RoT consumers,
assuming individual bargaining between each worker and the firm does not change the steady-state results at all
and only slightly changes the dynamics of wages.
same unemployment rates6. Thus, following standard practice, the Nash bargain process
6 Instead of relying on a trade union, we could have used the notion of collective bargaining on a single con-
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The third term on the right hand side of (48) is part of the reservation wage that
depends only on the existence of impatient workers (only if τb > 0 this term is different
from zero). It can be interpreted as an inequality term in utility. The economic intuition
is as follows: impatient consumers are constrained by their collateral requirements so
that they are not allowed to use their entire wealth to smooth consumption over time.
However, they can take advantage of the fact that a match today will continue with some
probability (1− σ) in the future, yielding a labor income that in turn will be used to
consume tomorrow. Therefore, they use the margin that hours and wage negotiation
provide them to improve their lifetime utility, by narrowing the gap in utility with respect
to patient consumers. In this sense, they compare the discounted intertemporal mar-
ginal rate of substitution had they not been income constrained

βl
λl1t+1
λl1t

to the expected
rate given their present rationing situation

βb
λb1t+1
λb1t

. For example if, caeteris paribus,
βl
λl1t+1
λl1t
> βb
λb1t+1
λb1t
the third term in (48) is positive, which indicates that impatient workers
put additional pressure on the average reservation wage as a way to ease their period-by-
period constraint in consumption. The size of this inequality term is positively related to
the earning premium of being matched next period

λbht+1
λb1t+1

, because it increases the value
of a match to continue in the future, and negatively related to the job finding probability
(ρwt ), that reduces the loss of breaking up the match. Finally, notice that when τ
b = 0, all
consumers are patient and, therefore, the solutions for the wage rate and hours simplify to
the standard ones (see Andolfatto, 2004).
3.6 Policy instruments and the accounting identity
We assume the existence of a central bank in our economy that follows a Taylor’s interest
rate rule:
1+ rnt =

1+ rnt−1
rR

(1+ πt−1)
1+rπ

yt−1
y
ry
(1+ rn)
1−rR
(50)
where y and rn are steady-state levels of output and interest rate, respectively. The para-
meter rR captures the extent of interest rate inertia, and rπ and ry represent the weights
given by the central bank to inflation and output objectives. Finally, to close the model,
output is defined as the sum of demand components.
yt = Atk1−αt−1 (nt−1l1t)
α = ct + jt

1+
φ
2

jt
kt−1

+ gt + κvvt (51)
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of the intertemporal budget constraint
bt = gt + trht +
(1+ rnt−1)
1+ πt
bt−1 (52)
where trht stands for lump-sum transfers/taxes. In order to enforce the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint, the following fiscal policy reaction function is imposed
trht = trht−1 − ψ1

bt
gdpt
−

b
gdp

− ψ2

bt
gdpt
− bt−1
gdpt−1
	
(53)
where ψ1 > 0 captures the speed of adjustment from the current ratio towards the desired
target

b
gdp

. The value of ψ2 > 0 is chosen to ensure a smooth adjustment of current debt
towards its steady-state level.
4. Calibration
Parameters from previous studies
The benchmark is calibrated using standard values in the literature for some parameters
and matching some relevant data moments for the US economy. Thus, we take the value
from Iacoviello (2005) for the subjective intertemporal discount rate of patient households,
βl = 0.99, the subjective discount rate of impatient households, βb = 0.95, the adjustment
cost for housing capital φh = 0.0 and the value τ
b = 0.36 for the fraction of impatient
consumers in the economy. In keeping with the results estimated in Iacoviello and Neri
(2010), we choose the two values for the loan-to-value ratio that characterize the low and
high indebtedness regime: mb = 0.735 and mb = 0.985 respectively. We take a very
standard value for the Cobb-Douglas parameter α = 0.7. We take the depreciation rate
of physical capital δ = 0.025 and the elasticity of matching to vacant posts χ2 = 0.5
from Monacelli et al (2010), whereas the exogenous transition rate from employment to
unemployment, σ = 0.15, comes from Andolfatto (1996) and Cheron and Langot (2004).
These authors also provide some average steady-state values, such as the probability of a
vacant position becoming a productive job, which is assumed to be ρ f = 0.9, the fraction
of time spent working, l1 = 1/3, and the fraction of time households spend searching
l2 = 1/6. The long-run employment ratio is computed to be n = 0.75 as in Choi and
Rios-Rull (2008). Furthermore, we assume that equilibrium unemployment is socially-
efficient (see Hosios, 1990) and, as such, λw = 0.5 is equal to 1− χ2. For the intertemporal
labor elasticity of substitution, we consider η = 2 implying that average individual labor
supply elasticity

η−1

1/l1 − 1

is equal to 1, the same as in Andolfatto (1996). The
Government revenues and expenditures each period are made consistent by means
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adjustment costs parameter for productive investment φ = 5.95, is taken from QUEST
II, which considers the same function as ours for capital installation costs. Parameters
affecting the New Phillips Curve are also standard in the literature. We set a value of
θ = 6 for the elasticity of final goods implying a steady state markup of θθ−1 = 1.2. Hence,
the steady state value for the marginal cost is obtained as mc = θ−1θ . The probability of
not changing prices, ω, is set to 0.75, meaning that prices change every four quarters on
average, whereas we take an intermediate value, ς = 0.4, for inflation indexation.
Calibrated parameters from steady-state relationships
We normalize both steady-state output (y) and real housing prices (q) to one. Steady-
state government expenditure g/y, is set to 17 per cent of output (US Bureau of Economic
Analysis data for 2009). We obtain the long-run value for vacancies from (46) v = σn/ρ f .
Then, we calibrate the ratio of recruiting expenditures to output (κvv/y) to represent 0.5
percentage points of output, as in Cheron and Langot (2004) or Choi and Rios-Rull (2008),
and very close to the value of 0.44 implied by the calibration of Monacelli, Perotti and
Trigari (2010). From this ratio we obtain a value of κv = 0.04 and using the steady-state
version of equation (45), we can solve for the value of wages (w). The steady-state value
of matching flows in the economy equals the flow of jobs that are lost (σn) and we use
the equality (σn = χ1v
χ2 [(1− n) l2]1−χ2 ) to solve for the scale parameter of the matching
function χ1 = 1.56.
The the long-run value of total factor productivity, A = 1.521, is calibrated from
the production function (51), using (3) and (9) to obtain the steady-state value of Tobin’s q
ratio, λ
l
2
λ
l
1
, the return on capital (r) from (8) and the steady-state value for the capital stock
(k) from (42). The capital stock together with the depreciation rate and the adjustment cost
parameter allow us to calculate the value of gross investment for the steady state, and,
using (51), the level of consumption c. The steady-state value of the nominal interest rate
rn, is related to the intertemporal discount rate of lenders through the steady-state version
of equation (10). The value for the transfers in the steady-state trh are such that from (52)
the resulting debt to output ratio is 60 per cent on annual terms. In order to compute κ f ,
we aggregate the income restriction of both households in the steady-state, to obtain
c+ j

1+ δ
φ
2

+ gt = nwl + rk+ κ f
where κ f =

1− τb

dl .
Let γl be the ratio of assets of patient households in the steady-state to total output
(b
l
= γly) and conditional to the value of γl , we can obtain the steady-state values of
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several variables. Equation (24) yields b
b
. Next, we can compute the steady-state level of
consumption of borrowers cb, from the budget restriction (14) and the consumption level
of lenders cl , from the aggregation equation (22). Our next step consists in calibrating
steady-state levels of the marginal utilities of consumption of both types of consumers,
λ
l
1 and λ
b
1, from their respective first-order conditions in equations (7) and (18). We can
then obtain the borrowers’ steady-state housing holdings xb from (15), and the long-run
equilibrium value of the collateral constraint shadow price μb from (19). This makes it
possible to compute the parameter that accounts for the housing weight in life-time utility
φx, from the last first-order condition of borrowers’ optimization program (equation (20)).
The value of the parameter φx enables us to compute the steady-state holdings of housing
for lenders xl , from the first order condition (11), and the fixed stock of real estate in the
economy X, from the aggregation rule (25). Notice that the values we obtain for φx and
X depend on the value we assign to the ratio of assets of patient households in the steady
state to total output γl . In order to produce a sensible calibration of this parameter and the
steady-state level of the variables, we follow Iacoviello (2005) and choose a value for γl ,
such that the total stock of housing over yearly output is 140 per cent. The resulting value
for φx is 0.10.
As regards preference parameters in the household utility function, φ1 = 1.595 is
calculated from the steady-state version of expression (49). A system of three equations
implying the steady state of expressions (12) (21) and (48) is solved for φ2, λ
b
h and λ
l
h. The
resulting value for φ2 is 1.043. Therefore the calibrated values for φ1 and φ2 are similar to
those in Andolfatto (1996) and other related research in the literature. Such values imply
that the value for leisure imputed by an employed worker is well above that imputed by
an unemployed worker.
Shocks and policy rule parameters
The parameters rR = 0.73 and rπ = 0.27 in the interest rate rule are taken from Iacoviello
(2005). We choose a value of 0, for the parameter measuring the interest rate reaction to
output ry, and assume ψ1 = 0.01 and ψ2 = 0.2 for the fiscal rule. Finally, the government
expenditure shock persistence ρg is equal to 0.75, as in Brückner and Pappa (2010).
5. Results
5.1 Fiscal policy in models with financially restricted consumers.
In this subsection we present impulse-response functions to a (one per cent of GDP) tran-
sitory public expenditure shock of some key macroeconomic variables: output, consump-
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tion, real wages, hours per worker, unemployment and vacancies7. The aim of this exercise
is to compare the effects of the fiscal shock under three different modeling strategies: a
basic search model with homogeneous consumers8, a search model with a 0.36 share of
RoT consumers9 and a search model with indebted consumers (0.36 share of impatient
consumers and a loan-to-value ratio of 0.985). All models share price rigidity that lasts for
four quarters.
The results are depicted in Figure 1. The output response to the public consumption
shock is positive in all three models. However, the expansionary effect varies substantially
across models, ranging from a high impact multiplier near 2 per cent in the RoT model,
to approximately 0.8 points in the basic search model with Ricardian consumers and an
intermediate value of around 1.2 per cent in an economy with credit constrained individ-
uals. These differences in output multipliers are explained by the different responses of
consumption across models. In a standard search model, populated only with optimizing
individuals, the consumption response to the fiscal shock is negative (impact consumption
multiplier of around −0.2), due to the negative wealth effect associated with expectations
of future tax rises to finance the increase in government expenditure. On the contrary,
the consumption response in the search model augmented with RoT consumers is highly
positive (approximately 1.8 per cent on impact). Finally, in the model with borrowing
restrictions, the impact on consumption is positive (around 0.4 points), but more modest
than in the presence of households that do not participate in the financial market.
In order to gain some economic intuition from this result it is worth looking at the
different consumption patterns of the three type of agents in these models, which we can
write as
clt =
⎡
⎣βlEt
⎛
⎝
rnt +1
1+πt+1
clt+1
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦
−1
(54)
cRoTt = wtl1tn
RoT
t−1 (55)
7 In this paper we do not assess the dynamic properties of the model. In a companion paper we conduct an
exhaustive analysis of a similar model subject to technology shocks and find that the proposed structure matches
the data moments of most labor market variables, both before and after the mortgage market deregulation in the
80s (Andrés, Boscá and Ferri, 2011).
8 Our benchmark model with impatient consumers that are credit constrained can be tranformed into a stan-
dard search and matching model with homogeneous consumers by setting τb = 0.
9 Eliminating preferences for housing from the utility function (φx = 0), setting the temporal discount rate
βb = βl and assuming that a share of households, τb ,consume just their current income converts the benchmark
model into a serch model with a τb share of RoT consumers.
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Figure 1: Effects of a transitory public consumption shock: basic search model,
search model with RoT’s, and search model with borrowers and lenders.
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cbt ≈ Θ

wtl1tnbt−1 + nwt

(56)
nwt =

qtxbt−1 −mb
Et−1 (qt (1+ πt)) xbt−1
(1+ πt)

(57)
Patient household consumption (54) is driven by expectations of future income since
they allocate their wealth optimally across time depending on income expectations and
the real interest rate. RoT household consumption responds one-to-one to changes in their
labor income (wtl1nRoTt−1 ) every period (55). The consumption possibilities of impatient
households (56) are determined not only by their current labor income but also by their
net worth 10. Net worth, (57), is defined as the value of households’ asset holdings net
of debt. As a consequence of the fiscal stimulus, the negative wealth effect on lenders
pulls the price of assets down, more than offsetting the capital gains on outstanding debt
caused by higher but sluggish inflation. The negative response of net worth weakens
the consumption response of leveraged agents as compared with that of fully constrained
non-leveraged agents.
This pattern of consumption responses is essential to understand the differences
in the dynamics of the main labor market variables. The increase in aggregate demand
pushes the relative price of the competitive sector up with respect to the non-competitive
sector

Pwt
Pt

and the demand for labor (49). Also, the increase in consumption of con-
strained agents raises their demand for leisure, thus reinforcing the relative bargaining
power of the union (48), which results in a substantial wage rise. This effect is signifi-
cantly smaller in the basic search model, in which the increase in the marginal utility of
consumption of Ricardian consumers weakens their bargaining position.
The quantitative differences at the intensive margin (average hours) lead to opposite
predictions regarding the response of the extensive margin, vacancies and unemployment,
as depicted in the final row of plots in Figure 1. Large increases in wages and hours
worked discourage new vacancy posting and reduce total employment as in the RoT
model, whereas in both the pure search model and in the model with leveraged house-
holds unemployment falls. In order to understand these different responses we must
look at the dynamic response of the P
w
t
Pt ratio which is a key determinant of the vacancy
posting decision. The RoT model generates large swings in this ratio that first rises, due
to the sluggish response of aggregate prices, Pt, and then falls sharply as aggregate prices
10 Equation (56) is as an approximation that holds exactly under linear preferences on labor supply and a
frictionless labor market. In the presence of search and matching frictions the marginal propensity to consume
(Θ) is not constant, but varies over the cycle (see Appendix 1).
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start increasing following the strong increase in consumption on impact. This reduces the
incentive to post vacancies (see equation (45)), which in turn contributes to generating
higher unemployment11. The response of the marginal cost is much more muted in the
other two models due to the modest reaction of aggregate consumption and hence of Pt+1.
Thus, although
Pwt+1
Pt+1
also falls once the upward adjustment of prices is underway, it remains
above the steady-state value, encouraging vacancy posting and reducing unemployment.
The previous analysis can be summarized as follows. First, it is possible to ob-
tain a Keynesian output multiplier for government expenditure (a multiplier higher than
one) and a positive response of aggregate private consumption in a model characterized
by the presence of impatient consumers that participate in financial markets. In that
case, the consumption response is positive, but lower than that predicted by the standard
model with rule-of-thumb consumers. Therefore, macroeconomic models that use RoT
consumers may be exacerbating the effects of fiscal policy. Second, while the use of RoT
consumers has become accepted in DSGE models on the basis of their ability to match a
positive correlation between consumption and government spending, they may generate
results in terms of the reaction of some labor market variables, in particular vacancies
and unemployment, that are at odds with what is observed in the data. Thus, although
some departure from the pure intertemporal substitution model is needed to generate
sound effects of fiscal innovations, the role of private leverage is vital to improve our
understanding of both the output and unemployment fiscal multipliers. Neither too much
nor the absence of intertemporal substitution seem realistic settings to study complex
issues such as those involved in the reaction to fiscal shocks. In what follows we look
at the role of the determinants of private indebtedness in more detail.
5.2 Fiscal policy and private indebtedness.
We now turn our attention to the study of the impact of the degree of private indebtedness
on the magnitude of fiscal multipliers. Figure (2) depicts the impact fiscal multipliers of
our variables of interest as a function of the share of borrowers (τb) and for two different
values of the loan-to-value (a low mb = 0.735 and a high mb = 0.985). These parametric
changes in the intensive (loan-to-value ratio) and extensive (share of borrowers in total
population) borrowing margins capture variations in the amount of household indebt-
edness in the economy. We define the fiscal multiplier on a variable x (x) as the ratio
between the initial change in the variable from its steady state
·
x0, and the initial variation
of government spending
·
g0, that is x =
·
x0·
g0
.
11 Pt+1 is expected to rise as prices in the non-competitive sector begin to adjust. The opposite is expected for
Pwt+1 due to a sharp decrease in wages and an increase in unemployment, which drag consumption and aggregate
demand down.
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Figure 2: Impact multiplier as a function of the share of borrowers
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The results in Figure 2 indicate that the fiscal multipliers to a transitory government
expenditure shock are very sensitive to the degree of private indebtedness of the economy.
When the borrowing capacity of borrowers is high (high loan-to-value ratio) the output
multiplier (first column, second row in the figure) is less than one only if the share of
borrowers in the population is very low (less than 25 per cent). However, increasing the
share of restricted consumers makes the output multiplier grow steadily to values around
1.75 when half of the population is subject to borrowing constraints. On the contrary, if
the loan-to-value is low (mb = 0.735), the impact output multiplier is always less than
one, no matter what the share of borrowers in the economy. Output behavior can be
better understood by looking at the response of aggregate consumption to the shock. The
borrowing capacity of an impatient household, and hence its consumption possibilities,
increases with the loan-to-value ratio, which is reflected in the vertical distance, for a given
share of borrowers, between the two lines depicting borrowers’ consumption. Addition-
ally, the share of impatient households in the population τb, positively affects the response
of aggregate consumption to the shock. This is due to a two-fold effect. On the one
hand, a higher τb puts additional pressure on wages, increasing borrowers’ income and
consumption. On the other hand, τb directly affects the weight of borrowers’ consumption
in aggregate consumption. Notice that in the wage equation the influence of τb is more
intense the higher the loan-to-value ratio, because τb is multiplying the inverse of the
marginal utility of consumption, 1
λb1t
(which increases with mb). As a result the impact of
the fiscal shock on wages, consumption and output increases faster with τb when mb is
high.
The pattern of wages and hours worked closely mimics that of the consumption
of constrained households. When the impact multiplier on consumption is high, there
is a sharp increase in aggregate demand that pushes relative prices P
w
t
Pt up and which
translates into higher impact multipliers on hours per worker. Interestingly, a positive
government expenditure shock always produces a positive multiplier in terms of vacan-
cies and employment (negative multiplier for unemployment). In this case, the impact
multiplier function is very similar for a high and low loan-to-value and very flat for a
share of borrowers lower than 0.4. This happens because vacancy posting at period t
and hence (un)employment depend crucially on expectations about tomorrow’s relative
prices (
Pwt+1
Pt+1
= mct+1) and labor costs (wt+1l1t+1), which are very similar for high and low
loan-to-value ratios, except when the share of borrowers in the economy is high enough.
Regarding housing prices, we observe a fall following the fiscal expansion in all cases.
However, the effect is stronger for high loan-to-value ratios and especially so as the share
of borrowers rises. The explanation for this finding can be found in the reaction of the
real interest rate, which increases more strongly when both mb and τb are high. This
encourages savers to postpone current consumption and reduces the demand for houses.
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All the previous results refer to impact multipliers, which are the most commonly
used in the literature. Recently Uhlig (2010) has argued that short run multipliers can be
misleading. Thus, in figure A.1 (Appendix 2) we check the sensitivity of our results to
calculate the present value fiscal multipliers at four and twenty quarters12, and we find a
similar pattern for them to the impact multiplier.
5.3 Fiscal multipliers, price stickiness and persistence.
The fiscal multiplier also depends on other characteristics of the economy that interact
with the magnitude of the financial friction. Here we study two such features that have
received special attention in the literature. First, the effect of the degree of price stickiness,
the relevance of which in explaining the business cycle properties of the US economy has
been analyzed in a search and matching framework by Krause and Lubik (2007). Second,
the effect of the persistence of the shock, which is a key policy parameter that deter-
mines the effects on economic activity of expansionary or consolidation fiscal packages
and which has been studied by Harms (2002), Galí et al. (2007) and Mayer, Moyen and
Stähler (2010), among others.
Figure 3 represents the impact multipliers as a function of the price rigidity para-
meter (ω) for the benchmark calibration of the share of borrowers (0.36) and for the two
regimes related to the loan-to-value ratio. The first important result is that the impact mul-
tipliers for high and low loan-to-value ratios are very similar when the value of ω is lower
than 0.5. Second, the impact multipliers become stronger as price stickiness increases
above the 0.5 threshold, in particular in an economy with high mb. Therefore, in highly
leveraged economies these multipliers can be considerably higher than in low leveraged
economies if price rigidity is important. Third, the model is able to generate a crowding-
in in consumption (and a Keynesian output multiplier) for values of the price rigidity
parameter higher than 0.6 (when mb = 0.985) or higher than 0.8 (when mb = 0.735).
Fourth, the vacancies and (un)employment multipliers are always positive (negative) for
any degree of price rigidity.
The main intuition behind all these results is that increasing price rigidity weakens
the positive response of the expected real interest rate and cushions the reduction in the
12 We define the net present value fiscal multiplier for variable x at date t as
xt =
t
∑
s=0
(1+ rnt )
−s ·xs
t
∑
s=0
(1+ rnt )
−s ·gs
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Figure 3: Impact multiplier as a function of price rigidity
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marginal cost in the next period
Pwt+1
Pt+1
(as compared to its current value). The former effect
dampens the fall in lenders’ consumption and housing prices. As the borrowing capacity
of impatient households depends on the value of their collateral, the milder reaction of
housing prices also helps to increase the consumption of borrowers (in comparison to
an economy with larger swings in asset prices). The latter effect, i.e. that related to the
behavior of relative prices
Pwt+1
Pt+1
, explains why vacancies and employment increase by more
with price rigidity.
Figure 4 presents the effects of the degree of persistence of fiscal shocks on the
impact multipliers of the variables of interest. In keeping with previous figures, results
are shown for a high and low loan-to-value ratio while keeping our benchmark calibration
for the share of borrowers and the degree of price rigidity. As can be seen, in an economy
with a low loan-to-value ratio and, thus, with limited indebtedness capacity of impatient
consumers, aggregate consumption impact multipliers are always negative and do not
vary notably with the degree of persistence of fiscal shocks. This crowding-out effect on
consumption results in output multipliers that are always lower than 1 in this scenario.
For a high mb the effects of the persistence of fiscal policy are more visible. In general
the multipliers obtained in a high leverage regime are more pronounced than those for
a low leverage regime, whatever the value of the persistence parameter. However, the
value of the multipliers in both regimes tends to converge when the fiscal stimulus is
highly persistent. In other words, when mb = 0.985, consumption, output, wage and
hours multipliers decrease substantially with the degree of persistence, whereas vacancies
and employment multipliers increase. Thus, when ρg is close to one, multipliers are very
similar in both leverage regimes.
In order to understand the economics behind these results, we have to once again
appeal to the reactions in real interest rates r
n
t +1
1+πt+1
and relative prices,
Pwt+1
Pt+1
. The degree
of persistence of fiscal shocks affects the consumption of savers in the same manner as in
Galí et. al (2007): higher persistence is associated with stronger negative wealth effects
that lower consumption. In our model, there is an additional mechanism at work, which
operates mainly through the consumption of indebted households. Higher persistence of
fiscal policy means that public expenditure will remain high tomorrow, implying persis-
tently higher real interest rates and thus lower current housing prices. These two effects
erode the borrowing and consumption capacities of impatient households and also result
in lower aggregate output and consumption multipliers.
What happens in the labor market? First, the mechanism explained above, opera-
ting through the marginal utility of consumption, is responsible for reducing the impact
multipliers on wages and hours when persistence increases. Second, a more persistent
government spending shock implies that aggregate demand in t+ 1 remains higher and
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Figure 4: Impact multiplier as a function of the shock persistence
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thus, relative prices will fall less tomorrow, improving the willingness of firms to posting
vacancies. As a consequence, if fiscal policy is more persistent in a high leveraged eco-
nomy, the impact multipliers of employment and unemployment are greater in absolute
value13.
5.4 Keynesian fiscal multipliers?
In this section we present some additional results about the impact output multiplier in
terms of the interaction of three key parameters in our model. Figure 5 shows the values of
the output multiplier as a function of the share of borrowers and the degree of persistence
of the fiscal shock, keeping price rigidity at the benchmark value and mb = 0.985. In the
first panel in the top of the figure, we depict a tridimensional plot showing the value of
the multiplier along the two dimensions. In particular, we are interested in the parameter
combinations that deliver a fiscal multiplier on output greater than one (Keynesian mul-
tiplier). In the second panel of the figure we represent contours of the previous figure
for three different values of the output multiplier (0.9, 1.0 and 1.1). As is clear from this
graph, a Keynesian multiplier can be obtained for a wide range of combinations of number
of borrowers and government spending shock persistence. For instance, if the share of
borrowers is higher than 0.4, we obtain a multiplier higher than one regardless of the
degree of persistence. However, if the share of borrowers is around 0.25, we need shock
persistence to be lower than 0.6 to obtain the Keynesian multiplier. The last panel in the
figure displays similar contours, but now from a tridimensional picture for an economy
with lower borrowing capacity (mb = 0.735). As we can see, in this case there are no
combinations of reasonable values of both parameters that generate Keynesian output
multipliers.
Figure 6 depicts the impact multipliers that result from the interaction among the
share of borrowers and the degree of price rigidity. We keep persistence at its baseline
value. As a general result, for parameters of price rigidity higher than 0.8 we always
obtain Keynesian output multipliers, as can be observed in the contour plots in the lower
panels of Figure 6. Interestingly, changes in the share of borrowers only affect the values of
the output multiplier if the price rigidity parameter is above a threshold near 0.6. The com-
bination of a very high loan-to-value ratio with high price rigidity and a large proportion
of constrained consumers causes the fiscal multiplier to skyrocket.
Finally, Figure 7 analyzes the effect of alternative combinations of the persistence of
the shock and price stickiness on output multipliers, keeping the share of borrowers at its
standard level. The graphs show that a price rigidity parameter roughly above 0.75 always
13 A sensitivity analysis of the results in this subsection to the time span considered to calculate the fiscal
multipliers can be found in Figures A.2 and A.3 in Appendix 2.
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generates a Keynesian multiplier whatever the persistence of the fiscal shock. Moreover,
when price rigidity is approximately above 0.6, increasing the persistence of the shock
reduces the value of the multiplier. However, the opposite is true when prices are very
flexible. In that case higher persistence contributes to increase the multiplier. Again, in
the low leverage regime (mb = 0.735), persistence does not interact with price rigidity to
produce significant changes in the multiplier.
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Figure 5: Impact fiscal multiplier as a function of the share of borrowers and persistence
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Figure 6: Impact fiscal multiplier as a function of the share of borrowers and price rigidity
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Figure 7: Impact fiscal multiplier as a function of persistence and price rigidity
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5.5 Fiscal consolidation and borrowing capacity.
In this section we use our model to examine the effects of fiscal consolidation driven by a
cut in public expenditure under two different scenarios regarding the borrowing capacity
of households. We also consider two alternative strategies about the path followed by
the government to reduce spending. In the first, the government reduces spending by
little in the present, but announces that it will be reduced by more in the future. In
the second, it is assumed that most of the government spending reduction takes place
in the first periods. Using Hall’s words (see Hall, 2009) we name the first scenario as
a "back-loading consolidation strategy" and the second as a "front-loading consolidation
strategy"14. In both cases we assume that the total cut in government expenditure is the
same, although the timing along a period of five years is quite different. More precisely,
and to stick to real numbers, we simulate a five-year back-loaded fiscal consolidation,
which is the inverse of the fiscal stimulus in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
as calculated by Cogan et. al. (2010, Figure 2). In the case of the front-loaded consolidation
strategy, government expenditure reductions follow an autorregressive pattern, with our
benchmark persistence parameter ρg = 0.75.
Figure 8 depicts the temporal pattern of government spending cuts for the two
scenarios considered quarterly. We feed our model with each of the strategies displayed in
the figure and calculate the effects on GDP under our two values of the loan-to-value ratio
(mb = 0.985 and mb = 0.735). By comparing the results for both values of the loan-to-value
ratio we intend to establish the influence of the capacity of households to borrow on the
output effects of a fiscal consolidation.
Table 1 presents the results yearly. According to the panel on the left-hand side
of the table, when the fiscal consolidation follows a back-loading strategy, borrowing
opportunities in the economy do not seem to play an important role in the GDP effects
of the consolidation. However, when government follows a very aggressive strategy of
fiscal consolidation, reducing government spending a great deal in the initial quarters, the
effects on GDP are very dependent on households’ borrowing opportunities. In particular,
fiscal consolidation is less harmful under a low indebtedness capacity situation. After
five years, a fiscal consolidation in a situation of a low loan-to-value ratio saves around
0.7 percent of lost GDP, with respect to scenario of high indebtedness capacity. Finally,
the results also indicate that in a situation of low borrowing (low loan-to-value ratio) the
front-loading strategy is less harmful than hypothetical back-loaded policy.
14 The question of delays in government spending is also a central point in Leeper et al (2010).
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Figure 8: Back-loaded fiscal consolidation and front-loaded fiscal consolidation
TABLE 1 − OUTPUT EFFECTS OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION
Back-loaded
fiscal consolidation
Front-loaded
fiscal consolidation
Year Reduction1 in gt Effect2 on GDP Reduction1 in gt Effect2 on GDP
Low mb High mb Low mb High mb
2012 -0.44 -1.12 -1.00 -1.29 -3.44 -3.72
2013 -0.76 -1.68 -1.68 -0.44 -0.56 -0.72
2014 -0.47 -0.88 -0.88 -0.14 -0.16 -0.28
2015 -0.23 -0.36 -0.40 -0.04 -0.04 -0.12
2016 -0.14 -0.28 -0.36 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
Sum -2.03 -4.32 -4.32 -2.03 -4.21 -4.88
1As a percentage of yearly GDP. 2Accumulated gains (percent of initial GDP).
5.6 Fiscal policy and a credit crunch.
Finally, we use our model to evaluate the capacity of fiscal policy to affect the economy in
a situation where private agents are forced into deleveraging due to a credit crunch. To
this end, we endogenize the loan-to-value ratio as mbt = (1+ ε
m
t )m
b, where εmt follows an
AR(2) process
εmt = φ
m
1 ε
m
t−1 + φ
m
2 ε
m
t−2 + ν
m
t
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with parameters φm1 = 1.83 and φ
m
2 = −0.836, and initial conditions for εmt−1 and εmt−2
equal zero. Starting from a high indebtedness capacity in the economy (mb = 0.985)
and νmt = 0, the loan-to-value ratio is temporarily reduced according to two different
magnitudes of the initial shock. In the first case (the slashed line in Figure 9), we hit the
AR(2) process reducing νmt by a one percentage point of m
b. This generates a maximum
reduction of approximately 4 percentage points of mb after 10 quarters, returning very
slowly afterwards to the initial value. We call this shock pattern a situation of mild credit
crunch. In the second case (dotted line in Figure 9), the initial fall in mb amounts to 4
percent, the loan-to-value ratio reaching a minimum value of 0.8. We call this scenario a
severe credit crunch15.
In order to isolate the effects of fiscal policy on relevant macroeconomic variables,
we run two simulations for each of the two credit crunch scenarios described above. First,
we simulate the effects on variables when we add the credit crunch to a (one percent of
GDP) positive fiscal shock. We obtain the response of the variables as relative deviations
from their steady-state values (
·
xt
x )
f ,cc. The impact effects corresponding to the previous
response in the initial period are displayed in columns 2B and 2C in Table 2. Second, we
obtain the response in the case of only a credit crunch shock (
·
xt
x )
cc (see columns 3B and
3C in Table 2 for the initial impact). The net effect of fiscal policy is then computed as
the difference between both responses

(
·
xt
xss )
f ,cc − (
·
xt
xss )
cc
	
. Columns 1B and 1C in Table 2
capture the initial impacts of this net effect, which should be compared with column 1A,
representing the net effects of fiscal policy when the credit crunch shock is absent.
In Figure 10 we perform the same comparison between the net effects of fiscal
policy for a time span of 10 quarters. The main message stemming from this exercise
is that fiscal policy in the presence of a severe credit crunch can still generate positive and
significant effects on consumption and output as suggested, for example, in Eggertsson
and Krugman (2010). However, the net effects of fiscal policy on these variables do not
augment with the intensity of the deleveraging effort in the economy. This is so despite
the net effect of government spending on borrowers’ debt, house prices and the stock
of houses favoring consumption expenditure the more intense the credit crunch is. The
intuition that public spending impulses can help to prevent a more intense deterioration
of the net worth in the presence of a severe contraction of private credit is confirmed by
the results in Figure 10. However, this is insufficient to ensure a stronger response from
borrower consumption and output due to the reaction of labor income and especially real
wages and hours worked. The net multiplier is, if anything, somewhat smaller the worse
15 As pointed out by Eggertsson and Krugman (2010), when the economy sufferers a rapid period of private
deleveraging it can easily run into the zero bound for the interest rate. This exercise has been designed so that
the nominal interest rate does not hit the zero bound in any of the periods considered.
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the deterioration of credit conditions in the economy16. Interestingly, the extensive margin
of employment reacts more positively to the fiscal shock the more severe the credit crunch
is. This is so because fiscal policy does not affect real wages as much in this case, which in
turn moderates the (negative) impact on vacancy posting. Hence, although the differential
output effect of fiscal stimuli in the event of a sharp credit contraction does not show up
in this model, this policy can play a more important role in sustaining employment in a
creditless slump.
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Figure 9: Three credit crunch scenarios
16 Note, however, that our experiment abstracts from reaching the zero bound, in which case fiscal policy can
recover vitality, as Chrsitiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009) or Woodford (2010) show.
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TABLE 2 − IMPACT EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY
UNDER A CREDIT CRUNCH
No Credit Crunch Low Credit Crunch High Credit Crunch
Variable (1A) (1B) (2B) (3B) (1C) (2C) (3C)
Consumption 1.13 0.95 -3.37 -4.32 0.65 -13.84 -14.49
Output 1.57 1.48 -0.74 -2.22 1.33 -6.18 -7.51
Total Hours(∗) 2.29 2.25 0.21 -2.05 2.18 -5.17 -7.35
Real Wage 2.14 1.78 -3.23 -5.01 1.12 -14.91 -16.03
House Prices -0.39 -0.34 -1.02 -0.68 -0.26 -2.98 -2.72
Real Interest (bp) 3.50 7.74 -11.17 -12.75 19.13 -40.31 -38.86
Inflation (bp) 30.25 26.68 -27.81 -54.49 20.75 -149.9 -170.6
Borrow. Debt -0.21 -0.13 -3.62 -3.49 0.04 -14.22 -14.26
(1A), (1B) and (1C): Net Effects of Fiscal Shock.
(2B) and (2C): Fiscal shock and Credit Crunch.
(3B) and (3C): Credit Crunch.
(*) The reduction in total hours is accompanied by a small positive reaction of employment after the credit crunch.
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Figure 10: Net effects of fiscal policy under a credit crunch
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6. Conclusions
Fiscal policy multipliers are small in neo-Keynesian models with many Ricardian features.
The intertemporal substitution mechanisms wipes out the expansionary effects of fiscal
stimuli depressing investment and consumption. Alternatively, models with consumers
that do not participate in the financial market (RoT) are capable of producing strong fiscal
responses of output. Unfortunately these models have two major flaws, one in terms of the
assumptions made and the other empirical. These models overlook an important feature
of modern economies in which many households do not base their consumption decisions
either on the basis of their permanent income or of their labor income only, since they have
limited but non-zero borrowing capacity. This implies that some of these agents carry a
given amount of debt and presumably some asset holdings, that affect their consumption
possibilities. The current recession after a period of easy financial conditions that has
caught many households highly leveraged is a good case in point. On empirical grounds
and under fairly general conditions, the RoT model fails to deliver theoretical impulse
responses of vacancies and employment to fiscal shocks consistent with those in the data.
In this paper we augment the search and matching model with a proportion of total
households that are more impatient than others who borrow up to a limit given by the
expected collateral value of their asset (housing) holdings. The interaction between the
consumption decisions of agents with limited access to credit and the process of wage
bargaining and vacancy posting delivers three main results: (a) higher initial leverage
makes it more likely to find output multipliers higher than one; (b) a positive government
expenditure shock always produces a positive multiplier for vacancies and employment;
(c) output (employment) multipliers decrease (increase) markedly with the degree of shock
persistence and increase with the degree of price stickiness. We carry out two simple
exercises with our model and find that: first, the GDP cost of fiscal consolidations is, if
anything, higher when the loan-to-value ratio is also high; and second, the use of fiscal
stimuli can partially counteract the negative effect on output of a credit crunch, but the
fiscal multiplier (net of the deleveraging effect) does not increase, and even falls, with
the severity of the credit crunch. Finally, the presence of an intensive and an extensive
margin of employment in the model explains why many of the factors that weaken the
output response to increases in government spending shocks do in many cases reinforce
the (un)employment multipliers.
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Appendix 1: Derivation of the borrowers’ consumption function
From the borrowers’ problem we have (assume φh = 0)
λb1t =
1
cbt
(1.1)
λb1t = β
bEtλb1t+1

1+ rnt
1+ πt+1

+ μbt (1+ r
n
t ) (1.2)
λb1tqt =
φx
xbt
+ μbt m
bEtqt+1 (1+ πt+1) + βbEtqt+1λb1t+1 (1.3)
bbt ≤ mbEt

qt+1 (1+ πt+1) xbt
1+ rnt

(1.4)
From (1.2)
μbt =
1
1+ rnt

λb1t − βbEtλb1t+1

1+ rnt
1+ πt+1

Using this expression in (1.3)
λb1tqt =
φx
xbt
+mbEtqt+1
(1+ πt+1)
1+ rnt

λb1t − βbEtλb1t+1
1+ rnt
1+ πt+1

(1.5)
+βbEtqt+1λb1t+1
Define in (1.4) Ωt+1 = mbEt
qt+1(1+πt+1)
1+rnt
so that
bbt ≤ mbEt

qt+1 (1+ πt+1) xbt
1+ rnt

= Ωt+1xbt (1.6)
Substituting into (1.5)
λb1tqt =
φx
xbt
+

λb1t − βbEtλb1t+1
1+ rnt
1+ πt+1

Ωt+1
+βbEtqt+1λb1t+1
or
λb1t (qt −Ωt+1) =
φx
xbt
+ βb

Etqt+1λb1t+1 − Etλb1t+1
1+ rnt
1+ πt+1
Ωt+1

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Using (1.1)
qt −Ωt+1
cbt
=
φx
xbt
+ βbEt
⎛
⎝ qt+1 −
1+rnt
1+πt+1
Ωt+1
cbt+1
⎞
⎠ (1.7)
From the budget constraint
cbt + qtx
b
t − bbt = wtl1tnbt−1 + qtxbt−1 −
(1+ rnt−1)
1+ πt
bbt−1
Using (1.6)
cbt + qtx
b
t −Ωt+1xbt = wtl1tnbt−1 + qtxbt−1 −
(1+ rnt−1)
1+ πt
Ωtxbt−1
Define the net worth as
nwt = qtxbt−1 −
(1+ rnt−1)
1+ πt
bbt−1 = qtx
b
t−1 −
(1+ rnt−1)
1+ πt
Ωtxbt−1
nwt =

qt −
(1+ rnt−1)
1+ πt
Ωt

xbt−1 (1.8)
Thus
cbt + qtx
b
t −Ωt+1xbt = wtl1tnbt−1 + nwt (1.9)
Guess
cbt = Θ (.)

wtl1tnbt−1 + nwt

(1.10)
which states that borrowers’ consumption is a function of the networth and the current
income. From (1.7) and (1.8)
qt −Ωt+1
cbt
− φx
xbt
= βbEt
⎛
⎝
nwt+1
xbt
cbt+1
⎞
⎠ = βbEt

nwt+1 + wt+1l1t+1nbt − wt+1l1t+1nbt
xbt c
b
t+1

(1.11)
Using the negotiated wage equation (48) one can represent the labor income as a
function of consumption and other variables. Let write this relationship as
wtl1tnt−1 ≈ cbt H(.) (1.12)
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where H(.) is a function itself that fluctuates along the business cycle. Substituting into
(1.11)
qt −Ωt+1
cbt
− φx
xbt
= βbEt
⎛
⎝
1
Θ(.) c
b
t+1 − cbt+1H(.)
xbt c
b
t+1
⎞
⎠ = βbEt
⎛
⎝
1
Θ(.) − H(.)
xbt
⎞
⎠
or
qtxbt −Ωt+1xbt =

φx + β
b

1
Θ (.)
− H(.)

cbt
Making use of (1.9)
cbt +

φx + β
b

1
Θ (.)
− H(.)

cbt = wtl1tn
b
t−1 + nwt
or
cbt =

1+ φx + β
b

1
Θ (.)
− H(.)
−1 
wtl1tnbt−1 + nwt

In order the guess (1.10) to be verified
Θ (.) =

1+ φx + β
b

1
Θ (.)
− H(.)
−1
or
Θ (.) =
1− βb
1+ φx − βbH(.)
Hence,
cbt =
1− βb
1+ φx − βbH(.)

wtl1tnbt−1 + nwt

(1.13)
Given that equation (1.13) is an approximation to the real consumption function,
in Figure A.0 we have depicted the impulse-response functions to a (one per cent of
GDP) transitory public expenditure shock of borrowers consumption and the sum of labor
income and net worth these consumers. As can be seen, our approximation is quite exact
in the case of a high loan-to-value-ration, while there is a certain gap in a low loan-to-value
scenario.
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Figure A.0: Response of labor income, net worth and borrowers consumption to a fiscal shock.
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Appendix 2: One-year and five-year multipliers
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Figure A.1: Multipliers as a function of the share of borrowers
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Figure A.2: Multipliers as a function of price rigidity
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Figure A.3: Multipliers as a function of the shock persistence
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